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YUGOSLAVIA AND THE POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 1960S

The Third Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in Lusaka

Jugoszlávia és az elnemkötelezettség politikája az 1960-as évek második felében

Az el nem kötelezettek mozgalmának harmadik konferenciája Lusakában

Jugoslavija i politika nesvrstanosti u drugoj polovini 1960-ih

Treća konferencija Pokreta nesvrstanih u Lusaki

Based on material from the Archives of Yugoslavia (Belgrade, Serbia) as well as a number of international documents and analytical papers published in English on the Internet, the article attempts to analyse the development of the policy of non-alignment in the second half of the 1960s, the role Yugoslavia and personally President Josip Broz Tito played in it, and the ways to extricate the Non-Aligned Movement from crisis. The initiatives to hold an international summit dedicated to cooperation between the countries of Asia, Africa, and some other regions of the world and the reasons for the success of the Yugoslav-Indian concept of non-alignment are explored in broad international context. Consideration is given to the preparation of the Lusaka conference; the range of issues under discussion; the structure of the permanent institutions of the Non-Aligned Movement that emerged at the summit; the impact of decisions made on the further development of the Non-Aligned Movement in the 1970s.

Keywords: Yugoslavia, foreign policy, diplomacy, Non-Aligned Movement, the Non-Aligned Conference in Lusaka, Josip Broz Tito

The policy of non-alignment, which was understood as active peaceful coexistence in the international arena, has traditionally been considered by Yugoslav historical science as one of the most important foundations of the state structure and political course of the country. Along with self-government, it was a key feature of the Yugoslav model of socialism (see Mates, Leo. 1970; Mates, Leo. 1976; Petranović, Branko. 1988; etc.). Largely following in line with this tradition, present-day historiography of the post-Yugoslav countries, as represented by such prominent scholars as Dragan Bogetić, Ljubodrag Dimić, Aleksandar Životić, Tvrtko Jakovina, also pays special attention to the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War (see Bogetić, Dragan; Dimić, Ljubodrag. 2013; Bogetić, Dragan. 2006; *Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective*, 2017). The special decisive role of the SFR Yugoslavia in the movement allowed this country to have such influence in international relations that significantly exceeded its modest economic opportunities. Of particular significance is the research conducted by Jovan Čavoški. Based on rich archival material from all over the world, he has recently published a comprehensive monograph on the Non-Aligned Movement summits, which correlates the history of Yugoslav foreign policy with the global international context (Čavoški, Jovan, 2022). International and political events of recent years and the course of the current Serbian leadership have unexpectedly revived the study of Yugoslav non-alignment both in the West and in Russia. However, it has been the subject of systematic scholarly research in our country (see Novosel'cev, Boris S. 2015(a)).

This article attempts to study the circumstances of the crisis of the non-aligned policy in the second half of the 1960s, to consider attempts to overcome it and organize a new summit of the non-aligned countries' leaders, and also to determine the significance of the conference held in Lusaka (1970) in the history of the Non-Aligned Movement.

Crisis in the policy of non-alignment in the second half of the 1960s

In the second half of the 1960s, the policy of non-alignment, which united mainly the countries of the Third World, was passing through a crisis (for more, see Novosel'cev 2013, 40–48). The achievements of the first two non-aligned conferences were gradually fading away. The Belgrade conference (1961) (for more, see Novosel'cev 2015(a), p. 13–40; Bogetić, Dimić 2013, Bogetić 2006) and the Cairo Conference (1964) (for more, see Novosel'cev 2015(b), 125–140) demonstrated the possibility of unification and joint actions of the states that were not included in military-political blocs and enshrined the basic principles of non-alignment. Non-alignment represented an attempt to find a “third

way” in international relations as an alternative to the confrontation between blocs and to get an opportunity for simultaneous cooperation with the USSR and the USA on the basis of compliance with the principles of equality, respect for sovereignty, and non-interference in internal affairs. At the same time, the more non-aligned countries appeared, the more disputes and contradictions arose between them, which weakened their unity.

For example, in the first half of the 1960s there was a confrontation between two initiatives and two approaches to the movement of the Third World countries. The Chinese-Indonesian understanding of the essence of the Afro-Asian movement was purely regional, which meant that it could not include, for example, Yugoslavia, but China would play a key role in it. The Yugoslav-Indian concept assumed a more universal vision of the geographical composition of its participants (see Čavoški 2021). The first approach was characterised by its radical position, according to which the main task was to decisively struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism, which originated from the idea of the confrontation between the “old” and “new” forces, the Global North and the Global South (AJ. KPR. I-1/438. Poruka Predsednika Indonezije Dr. Ahmeda Sukarna Predsedniku Republike Josipu Brozu Titu. 19.01.1965). That initiative was often called the second Bandung, referring to the regional meeting of the representatives of Asian and African countries in April 1955, which became one of the first post-war manifestations of solidarity among the Third World nations. The other approach, “the second Belgrade” associated with holding a new conference of non-aligned countries, was reflected in Josip Broz Tito’s speech delivered on October 23, 1963 at the 18th session of the UN General Assembly. The Yugoslav president paid special attention to the need to codify the principles of peaceful coexistence because, in his opinion, it covered all other issues – world peace, resolving conflict situations on the basis of a mutually acceptable compromise, the fight against discrimination in relations between developed and developing states, etc. In addition, he announced the development of non-alignment into a broader movement for peaceful coexistence with more participants (AJ. KPR. I-2/17-7. Put J.B. Tita na XVIII zasedanje Generalne Skupštine OUN. 22-25.10.1963 // Govor J. B. Tita v OUN).

It should be noted that in the context of the recent war between India and China (October–November 1962) and harsh Sino-Yugoslav debate, relations between the parties were hostile. Despite the victory of the countries with a moderate and more universal position, the clash of the initiatives demonstrated a split among the non-aligned states. The Second Conference of Non-Aligned Countries was held in Cairo in 1964, but after the coups in Algeria against Ahmed Ben Bella in June 1965, in Indonesia against A. Sukarno in October 1965, and

in Ghana against Francis Kwame Nkrumah in February 1966, the idea of an Afro-Asian summit was not implemented. Nevertheless, there remained a radical trend among the non-aligned countries which suggested giving the movement a more “revolutionary and progressive” character relying on “dynamic forces” in Asia and Africa and anti-imperialism. In the run-up to the Lusaka conference, Algeria was considered a leader of that group (AJ. KPR. I-4-a/9. III konferencija nesvrstanih zemalja. Lusaka. 8-10.09.1970 // Informativno-politički material // Dokumentacija za konferenciju na vrhu).

It became increasingly difficult to reach joint decisions. Some states even changed their previous positions. For example, after another military defeat by Israel in the Six-Day War (1967) in the Middle East, there was a noticeable evolution in the views on non-alignment of one of its founders and leaders, Gamal Abdel Nasser Hussein, President of the United Arab Republic, who now placed the main emphasis on cooperation with the USSR (including military cooperation). (Bogetić, Životić 2010; Novosel'cev 2017).

The US participation in the Vietnam War as well as the Arab-Israeli wars dispelled the illusions of the non-aligned leaders: non-alignment was hardly a way to curb the aggressor and to make him stop hostilities and move on to finding a compromise in resolving controversial issues. For instance, a conference of 15 non-aligned countries at the ambassadorial level was held in Belgrade in March 1965. It prepared an appeal to the opposing parties in the Vietnam conflict with a proposal to immediately begin negotiations, but that appeal was perceived negatively (Bogetić 2018, 164). The attempt at mediation failed. Even having united their efforts, the leaders of non-aligned states could not achieve the degree of influence on the world processes consistent with their ambitions. The aggravation of internal political problems (deterioration of economic situation, border conflicts,¹ instability of ruling regimes² in Asian and African countries) pushed them towards the superpowers, even if at the cost of losing a certain share of sovereignty. At the same time, it was not the matter of renouncing non-alignment. On the contrary, more and more Third World countries declared their adherence to the basic principles of that policy. The problem was that they were unable to achieve unity when it came to specific international problems and crises, which entailed stagnation of joint activity and the inability to exert a significant influence on the solution of not only global but also regional issues.

Under such circumstances, the leaders of non-aligned countries and the main beneficiaries of non-alignment (Yugoslavia stood out among them) needed to

¹ E.g., the Indo-Pakistani conflict (1965)

² E.g., the abovementioned coups in Ghana, Algeria, and Indonesia as well as the overthrow of ruling regimes in Nigeria and Cambodia.

demonstrate their commitment to the basic principles of the policy and show that it was still relevant. To that end, an initiative was put forward to hold the third conference. Its diplomatic preparation included the tripartite meeting of Tito, Nasser, and Indira Gandhi in Delhi in January 1968 (unexpectedly for the Yugoslavs, it was joined by Soviet Prime Minister A.N. Kosygin (for more, see Novosel'cev, Boris S. 2015(a), 274–276)) and the traditional tour of the Yugoslav president (that time he went to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Republic (AJ. KPR. I-2/37-(4-7)). However, the preparation of the conference was interrupted by the invasion of Czechoslovakia by five Warsaw Pact countries in August 1968.

Seeing that as a threat to its security and sovereignty, Yugoslavia strongly condemned those actions, which caused yet another conflict with Moscow.

The non-aligned countries did not have a unified stance on the issue. The United Arab Republic, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, South Yemen, Somalia, Algeria, Mali, Nigeria, Guinea, and Cambodia supported the intervention or responded moderately. Ethiopia, Tunisia, Indonesia, Zambia, Kenya, and Ceylon condemned Soviet aggression and called for the intensification of the policy of non-alignment. The press of socialist countries began a campaign criticizing non-alignment. Under such conditions, holding the conference that would inevitably raise the question of intervention was fraught with danger of splitting the whole movement. The preparatory meeting of representatives of the participating countries of the future non-aligned summit scheduled for September 1968 in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) was cancelled, and Tito refused the proposal of the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie I to convene an extraordinary summit of peace-loving countries, at which the condemnation of Soviet aggression and further measures to preserve peace would be the only question on the agenda (AJ. KPR. I-3-a/24-25. Poseta Cara Etiopije Haila Selasija 23-25.9.1968 // Informativni materijal).

*The role of Yugoslav personal diplomacy in the preparation of
a new conference of non-aligned countries*

According to many opinions, the Non-Aligned Movement appeared to have ultimately collapsed at that moment (CIA. FOIA. Weekly Summary Special Report the Third Nonaligned Summit: The Swan Song of Yugoslav Predominance. 04.09.1970. URL: <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020044-2.pdf>). Tito played a key role in reviving it, agreeing on a common platform acceptable to the majority of participating countries, and bringing the Non-Aligned Movement to a new level. His personal diplomacy during that period (trips to Asian and African countries,

the ability to find an approach and a common language with the leader of each state) became one of the key components of the resultant success. For Yugoslavia, whose foreign policy “pendulum” swung even closer towards cooperation with the USSR (see Novosel’cev 2015(a), 223–244) after the Middle East crisis of 1967, the conflict with Moscow in 1968 (the third conflict in 20 years) meant that it was necessary to more firmly adhere to a position equidistant from the superpowers. In doing so Belgrade tried to get the opportunity to pursue an independent foreign policy. For the Yugoslavs, that increased the importance of the Non-Aligned Movement as the third point of support in their manoeuvring between the superpowers. It is curious that India’s sceptical stance on the issue of institutionalization of the Non-Aligned Movement in the 1950s–1960s was based on a similar precondition, i.e. the need to maintain equidistance in relations with the superpowers as a guarantee of cooperation with them. According to Delhi, the formation of a structured movement of non-aligned countries, on the contrary, would inevitably put that into question (Bogetic 2014, 618).

Through the efforts of Yugoslav diplomacy and Tito personally, a consultative meeting of representatives of 51 non-aligned countries was held in Belgrade in early July 1969 to discuss a future non-aligned conference. Many of the delegates did not share the Yugoslav leader’s enthusiasm about the very possibility of holding the conference. However, consultations continued at the 14th session of the UN General Assembly: having met in New York, the foreign ministers of non-aligned countries decided to hold a preparatory meeting in April 1970 in Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) (CIA. FOIA. Weekly Summary Special Report the Third Nonaligned Summit: The Swan Song of Yugoslav Predominance. 04.09.1970. URL:<https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020044-2.pdf>).

At that point, it was possible to overcome a number of pitfalls that hampered the preparation of the conference: it was planned that the conference would be attended simultaneously by the Viet Cong³ and representatives of South Vietnam as well as two delegations from Cambodia: one headed by King Norodom Sihanouk⁴ (who was deposed on 18 March, 1970 and formed a government-in-exile in Beijing) and another headed by the new leader General Lon Nol⁵ (who maintained friendly relations with South Vietnam and Indonesia).

³ The National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (Viet Cong), a communist military political organization in South Vietnam, a party in the Vietnam War 1955–1975).

⁴ Norodom Sihanouk (1922–2012), a Cambodian statesman; at different times he was President of the State Presidium of Cambodia, Chief of State of Cambodia, King of Cambodia.

⁵ Lon Nol (1913–1985), a Cambodian statesman, politician, and military leader, Prime Minister (1966–1967, 1969–1971, 1970–1972) and President of Cambodia (1972–1975).

Assisted by North Vietnam and the Viet Cong troops, the forces that were loyal to Sihanouk began military operations against the Lon Nol regime and took control of part of Cambodian territory. In that conflict, Yugoslavia took the side of the deposed king, Tito's long-time acquaintance and ally in non-alignment. The positions of not only African but also Asian countries diverged, and in the capital of Tanzania it was decided to postpone controversial issues until the start of the summit, in which all conflicting parties were allowed to participate. The Provisional Government of South Vietnam had the status of an observer, and Lon Nol and Sihanouk participated in the conference, but not as official representatives of Cambodia (Bogetić 2018, 171-172).

Experts from the foreign policy group of the Yugoslav Foreign Secretariat called the meeting in Dar es Salaam a "watershed moment" in the organization of the summit (AJ. KPR. I-4-a/9. III konferencija nesvrstanih zemalja. Lusaka. 8-10.09.1970 // Dokumentacija o pripremama // Informacija o sastanku delegacije SFRJ za konferenciju nesvrstanih, održanom u Beogradu. 14.07.1970). It was there that the host country of the future non-aligned conference was determined. It was Zambia, and that naturally assumed that much attention would be paid to the problems of sub-Saharan Africa, such as issues of colonialism, racial discrimination, apartheid, which is why it was important to get the support of the states of that region. As early as in January–February 1970, Tito toured 8 countries of East Africa (see AJ. KPR. I-2/44 (1-8). Put J.B. Tita u Afriku),⁶ delivered a speech at the conference of the Organization of African Unity in Addis Ababa, and had a meeting with the US Secretary of State William P. Rogers.⁷ Tito and Rogers discussed the situation in the Middle East, a possible visit of Richard Milhous Nixon to Yugoslavia, and economic cooperation. Rogers was impressed by Tito's energy, humour, and friendliness, and noted that the Yugoslav leader was "exerting a beneficial influence on Nasser" in the Middle East issue (FRUS. Document 217. Memorandum from the Presidents Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon. February, 12. 1970. URL: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v29/d217>). At the same time, D. Belovski⁸ went on a tour of the West African countries, and Foreign Affairs Secretary M. Tepavac⁹ started a tour of Southeast Asia (CIA.

⁶ He visited Tanzania, Zambia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, Libya and Egypt.

⁷ William Pierce Rogers (1913–2001), an American politician and diplomat, Attorney-General of the United States (1957–1961), the United States Secretary of State (1969–1973).

⁸ Dimče Belovski (1923–2010), a Yugoslavian diplomat, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia (1965–1969), Ambassador to the USA (1976–1979).

⁹ Mirko Tepavac (1922–2014), a Yugoslavian social and political activist, diplomat, Foreign Affairs Secretary of the SFR Yugoslavia (1969–1972).

FOIA. Weekly Summary Special Report the Third Nonaligned Summit: The Swan Song of Yugoslav Predominance. 04.09.1970. URL:<https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020044-2.pdf>).

Yugoslav diplomacy attached great importance to Nasser's participation in the conference. He was urged, among other things, by personal messages from Tito and Indira Gandhi, to come to the summit in Lusaka at least for a short time to give a speech and return back to Cairo (AJ. KPR. I-4-a/9. III konferencija nesvrstanih zemalja. Lusaka. 8-10.09.1970. Informativno-politički material). However, confident that this would hardly contribute to a favourable solution to the Middle East crisis – his main concern, – Nasser did not come to the capital of Zambia.¹⁰ Probably, the Egyptian president's health problems also played a part (he died of a heart attack on 28 September 1970). However, poor health did not prevent him from convening an emergency congress of the Organization of Arab Unity in Cairo on 27–28 September, which was dedicated to the conflict between the Jordanian authorities and the militants of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

One way or another, contrary to Rogers' predictions, the Egyptian side demonstrated little much interest in consultations with Yugoslavia both on the situation in the Middle East and on the issue of holding a non-aligned conference (AJ. KPR. I-4-a/9. III konferencija nesvrstanih zemalja. Lusaka. 8-10.09.1970. Informativno-politički material. Dokumentacija za konferenciju na vrhu). The vast majority of other leaders of the Arab states (except for Sudan) followed Egypt's example (Bogetić 2014, 620). Upon returning to Belgrade, Tito called Nasser's absence in Lusaka an attempt to undermine, weaken its effect, and explained that by external pressure, which was a transparent hint at the Soviet side (Bogetić 2018, 167–168).

Course and significance of the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Lusaka

The Third Conference of Non-Aligned Countries took place from 6 to 14 September 1970, 6 years after the previous meeting in Cairo. This time the interval between summits was the longest in the history of the Non-Alignment Movement. Representatives of 54 participating countries gathered in Lusaka, and another 10 delegations arrived in Zambia as observers. The number of countries at the conference indicated that the interest in the policy of non-alignment and joint actions in the international arena did not grow weaker (Bogetić

¹⁰ The UAR delegation to the conference was headed by Minister of Foreign Affairs Mahmoud Riad.

2018, 167). The new participants represented mainly the African continent and Latin America: in addition to Cuba, there were Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, and Guiana. From among the European states, representatives of Austria and Finland were present as observers.

Members of the Yugoslav delegation stayed at the Intercontinental and Ridgway hotels; Tito, who flew to the capital of Zambia with his wife Jovanka, stayed at a country residence (AJ. KPR. I-4-a/9. III konferencija nesvrstanih zemalja. Lusaka. 08-10.09.1970. Informativno-politički material. Depeša iz Lusake. 02.09.1970). The instruction prepared by the protocol service of the Foreign Affairs Secretariat of Yugoslavia for the members of the delegation paid attention to their wardrobe during the trip. It said that it was necessary to take two dark summer suits for the official part of the programme and for ceremonial dinners. It was emphasized that it was quite cool, up to +15 Celsius, in the capital of Zambia in the evening, so in addition to dark glasses, it was recommended to take light jackets. Also, it was necessary to take more shirts: due to the arrival of a large number of guests, there were doubts that there would be enough laundry facilities for everyone (AJ. KPR. I-4-a/9. III konferencija nesvrstanih zemalja. Lusaka. 08-10.09.1970. Protokol).

Tito's schedule was quite busy. In addition to protocol events and work at the conference, it included up to ten meetings a day with the leaders of non-aligned countries. He had meetings with Sirimavo Bandaranaike¹¹ and Haile Selassie twice and with Indira Gandhi three times in 6 days, but he had only one meeting with the head of the Egyptian delegation Mahmoud Riad (AJ. KPR. I-4-a/9. III konferencija nesvrstanih zemalja. Lusaka. 08-10.09.1970. Susreti i razgovori. Susreti Predsednika Republike sa šefovima delegacija nesvrstanih zemalja u Lusaki od 7. do 12. septembra 1970). The duration of such meetings varied from 10–15 minutes to about an hour. Conversations were not always formal, as, for example, was the conversation with the Central African leader Jean-Bedel Bokassa. With his main non-aligned partners, Tito used those meetings to “synchronize watches” on the issues that were crucial to the resultant success of the summit.

Sessions at the first non-alignment conferences took place according to a pre-set stereotype: long speeches by the heads of delegations turned into discussions around concluding statements, the first drafts of which, at least until 1973, were usually prepared in advance and distributed by the Yugoslav side (Stubbs 2019). As the host country in Lusaka, Zambia received the mandate to prepare a preliminary draft declaration, but its representatives turned to the Indians and

¹¹ Sirimavo Ratwatte Dias Bandaranaike (1916–2000), a Ceylon politician, Prime Minister of Ceylon / Sri Lanka (1960–1965, 1970–1977, 1994–2000).

Yugoslavs for help in preparing the document (AJ. KPR. I-4-a/9. III konferencija nesvrstanih zemalja. Lusaka. 08-10.09.1970. Dokumentacija o pripremama. Iz izveštaja o drugom sastanku pripremnog komiteta za treću konferenciju šefova država ili vlada nesvrstanih zemalja).

Probably the most important decision of the Lusaka conference was the formation of the first institutional mechanisms that enabled the non-aligned states to carry out longer and more coordinated actions (Lusaka Resolutions. Resolution 13. Strengthening of the Role of the Non-Aligned Countries). To achieve that, it was necessary to overcome widespread fears that the initiative to institutionalize non-alignment would lead to the formation of a “third bloc” in the world. It is interesting to note that the representatives of India and Yugoslavia, the countries that were especially sensitive to the potentially negative response of the superpowers, were the main opponents of the establishments of regular bodies of the Non-Aligned Movement in the 1960s. In a conversation with Indira Gandhi on 7 September 1970 upon his arrival in Africa, Tito expressed doubts about Zambia’s proposal to establish a permanent secretariat of the Non-Aligned Movement (AJ. KPR. I-4-a/9. III konferencija nesvrstanih zemalja. Lusaka. 08-10.09.1970. Susreti i razgovori. Zabeleška o razgovoru Predsednika Republike sa Indiom Gandhi, 7. septembra 1970. u Lusaki). However, as a result of the conference, it was decided to appoint President Kenneth David Buchizya Kaunda¹² chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement. Thus, the principle was established according to which the leader of the country hosting the conference was recognized as the chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement until its next summit, and the secretariat and headquarters of the movement were located in his country for that period.

The powers of the chairman of the movement were significantly limited, in many respects they were even nominal, and his decisions were not binding on the participating countries. Regular conferences of the movement participants (every 4 years) as well as annual meetings at the level of foreign ministers constituted the main mechanisms for coordinating the efforts of non-aligned countries in the following decades. The conferences made an assessment of the current international situation and worked out a general strategic line. Decisions were often made not by voting but by consensus, i.e. the general agreement of the parties, which was considered the only possible form of reaching agreements in such a heterogeneous organization (see, e.g., AJ. KPR. I-4-a/9. III konferencija nesvrstanih zemalja. Lusaka. 08-10.09.1970. Informativno-politički material. Iz razgovora naših funkcionera sa stranim predstavnicima na temu NKN.

¹² Kenneth David Buchizya Kaunda (1924–2021), first President of Zambia (1964–1991).

04.09.1970). Consensus was of paramount importance. Any potential conflicts were transferred to private bilateral meetings and discussions. That often meant a lack of specifics at the summits, and many of the decisions were reduced to the formula “for all good, against all evil.” Meetings were also held at the United Nations, as the members of the movement were united in a separate group within the UN (Alimov 1985, 37).

The Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Countries was an important and influential body, and the Yugoslav side insisted on the role of the bureau as a political rather than administrative or technical instrument (Willets 1981, 34). It prepared the agenda for the meetings of representatives of non-aligned states, performed the functions of overseeing the discussions, and coordinated the political positions of non-aligned countries in the UN. Members of the bureau (initially there were 17, and 25 after 1976) were elected by voting. It is noteworthy that the most important institutions of the Non-Aligned Movement – the chairman and secretariat as well as the Coordinating Bureau – did not have permanent members. Thus, the degree of involvement of a particular country in the work of the governing bodies of the movement depended on the procedure of election by vote of all its participants.

A number of historians, for example, Dragan Bogetić, believe that the Non-Aligned Movement was finally formed in Lusaka rather than at the Belgrade or Cairo conferences: fearing deterioration of relations with the superpowers, the participants of those conferences did not establish permanent bodies, which are a key attribute of an international movement (Bogetić 2008. 154-155).

An example of a topic on which almost all countries agreed at the summit was the development of equal economic cooperation in the world. It implied granting large-scale assistance to the Third World by developed countries, with the abandonment of any preliminary political conditions. Such calls were made at the Belgrade Conference (1961) and were included in its “Political Declaration” (see Bogetić, Dimić, 2013), and they were also discussed at the Conference on the Problems of Economic Development in Cairo (9–18 July, 1962). The Lusaka Declaration on Non-Alignment and Economic Progress called on the UN “to bring about a rapid transformation of the world economic system, particularly in the field of trade, finance and technology, so that economic domination yields to economic co-operation” (Lusaka Resolutions. Resolution 14. Lusaka Declaration on Non-Alignment and Economic Progress). Almost a decade later, the content and form of demands for urgent changes in the global economy remained exactly the same. Needless to say, such declarations were so idealistic in nature that even their authors were unlikely to have doubts about the extent to which they could be implemented in practice.

As far as the issue of the war in Vietnam was concerned, different positions and different attitudes of the conference participants towards the parties in the conflict did not allow the formulation of concrete proposals in the outcome documents of the summit. As a result, it all came down to a formal expression of “its full support for the heroic struggle which the people of the Indo-China states continue to wage for freedom and independence” (Lusaka Resolutions. Resolution 5. Indo-China). The view of the parties on the issue of Arab-Israeli relations was also formal and unanimous. In the “Resolution on the Middle East,” they advocated immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all foreign troops from the occupied Arab territories. As in the case of Vietnam, no specific proposals or mechanisms for implementing the main provisions of the resolution were presented (Lusaka Resolutions. Resolution 8. The Middle East).

Significant disagreement was caused by the discussion of the resolution on Cyprus proposed by Archbishop Makarios,¹³ which contained phrasing in support of indivisibility and territorial integrity of that island state. The resolution was strongly opposed by the representatives of Arab countries who shared Turkey’s view, which was expressed in the support of the interests of the Cypriot Turkish community and ultimately in the desire to create two independent national states in Cyprus. It was possible to resolve that conflict and convince the Arabs not to oppose the adoption of the document largely due to Tito’s authority. The Yugoslav president was able to convince them that Cyprus’ withdrawal from the Non-Aligned Movement would push it towards NATO, and that would be fraught with the deployment of British and American military bases there and would weaken the position of the Arab states in the Mediterranean (Bogetić 2018. 173–174). The resolution on Cyprus was finally adopted, but it turned out to be the shortest of all (only a few lines). In addition, the Arab countries insisted on including the phrase about safeguarding the interests of Cypriot Turks (Lusaka Resolutions. Resolution 15. Cyprus).

At the Lusaka conference, Tito began to use the term “non-alignment,” which he had tried to avoid earlier. As the leader of a socialist country, he feared accusations that he did not see the differences between the imperialist policies of the West and the peace-loving course of socialist states (Bogetić 2014. 621, Čavoški 2021, 87–88). The terms “non-bloc policy,” “positive neutrality” or “neutralism” were more frequently used in the 1950s – early 1960s. Perhaps, in the conditions that existed after the intervention in Czechoslovakia, the use of the word “non-alignment” marked Tito’s determination to pursue the course

¹³ Archbishop Makarios III, born Michael Christodoulou Mouskos, a Greek Cypriot archbishop, primate, statesman and politician; the Archbishop of the autocephalous Church of Cyprus (1950–1977); the President of the Republic of Cyprus (1960–1977).

of equidistance from the superpowers, which Yugoslavia followed until the late 1980s, more consistently (see Mates 1970, Mates 1976, Petranović 1988).

Knowing that in accordance with diplomatic protocol tradition, Zambian President Kaunda had prepared gifts for the heads of delegations of non-aligned countries, the Yugoslavs brought to Lusaka reciprocal gifts to the host of the conference and his wife. They were presented with a large silver cigar box with a gold relief image of the city of Jajce on the lid and a commemorative engraving, a 13-piece crystal service for soft drinks [in Serbian, for compote – *B.N.*] for 6 persons, and a set of table textiles for 6 persons (AJ. KPR. I-4-a/9. III konferencija nesvrstanih zemalja. Lusaka. 8-10.09.1970. Dokumentacija o pripremama. Beleška. 03.09.1970). It is known that Kaunda was a vegetarian, did not smoke, did not drink alcohol and did not even keep it at home (Reshetnyak 1991. 94–97). Perhaps this explains such choice of memorable souvenirs for the leader of Zambia because diplomatic etiquette allows for the gift of alcoholic beverages. The Yugoslav side regularly made presents of sets of rakia or wine to the distinguished guests who visited Tito or during his trips abroad. For example, in 1967–1973 Tito met with L. Brezhnev in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union six times. Each time, a collection of alcohol, 30 bottles on the average, was an invariable part of the gift (AJ. KPR. I-3-a/101-153. Poseta Generalnog sekretara CK KPSS Leonida Iljiča Brežnjeva. 15-17.11.1976 // Informativni materijal // Pregled izdatih poklona niže navedenim ličnostima SSSR-a).

Summing up, one can disagree with the assessment given to the results of the Lusaka summit by Henry Alfred Kissinger, US President's Assistant for National Security Affairs. According to Kissinger, it was important for Tito, "dear to his heart but not very significant" (FRUS. Document 220. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon. Undated. URL: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v29/d220>). Not being organized at the first attempt, the conference was more than just a demonstration of overcoming the crisis in the Non-Aligned Movement. It consolidated the logic of its development in accordance with moderate Indian-Yugoslav ideas of non-alignment as a universal and constantly expanding world movement for the non-violent resolution of controversial issues, progress, mutually beneficial cooperation, and against interference of the great powers in the internal affairs of independent states. This consolidated the leading positions of Yugoslavia and India in the Movement and limited attempts to reduce it to either a purely regional unification of Afro-Asian states (behind which China's geopolitical interests were discernible) or radical position, according to which non-alignment was primarily anti-imperialist in nature and therefore acted as a natural ally of the USSR. Researchers refer to the 1970s as the Golden Age of the

Non-Aligned Movement (Bogetić 2010. 31), which was an independent actor in international relations with its pronounced political and economic interests. The undoubted leader in the movement was Yugoslavia.

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Boris S. NOVOSELTSEV

JUGOSZLÁVIA ÉS AZ ELMENKÖTELEZETTSÉG POLITIKÁJA AZ 1960-AS ÉVEK MÁSODIK FELÉBEN

Az el nem kötelezettek mozgalmának harmadik konferenciája Lusakában

A tanulmány a Jugoszláv Levéltár (Belgrád, Szerbia) anyagai, valamint számos nemzetközi dokumentum és az interneten angol nyelven közzétett elemző írás alapján kísérli meg értelmezni az el nem kötelezettek politikájának alakulását az 1960-as évek második felében, Jugoszlávia és Josip Broz Tito elnök szerepét, valamint az el nem kötelezettek mozgalmának válságból való kivezetésének módjait. Az ázsiai és afrikai országok, valamint a világ néhány más régiói közötti együttműködés nemzetközi csúcstalálkozójának megrendezésére irányuló kezdeményezéseket, valamint a jugoszláv–indiai el nem köteleződés koncepciója sikerének okait széles nemzetközi kontextusban vizsgálja. Figyelembe veszi a lusakai konferencia előkészítését, a megvitatott kérdések körét, az el nem kötelezett országok mozgalmának a csúcstalálkozáson létrejött állandó intézményei szerkezetét és a döntések hatását az el nem kötelezettek mozgalmának további fejlődésére az 1970-es években.

Kulcsszavak: Jugoszlávia, külpolitika, diplomácia, az elmenkötelezettség mozgalma, az el nem kötelezettek konferenciája Lusakában, Josip Broz Tito

Boris S. NOVOSELJCEV

JUGOSLAVIJA I POLITIKA NESVRSTANOSTI U DRUGOJ POLOVINI 1960-IH

Treća konferencija Pokreta nesvrstanih u Lusaki

Na osnovu građe Arhiva Jugoslavije (Beograd, Srbija), kao i niza međunarodnih dokumenata i analitičkih radova objavljenih na engleskom jeziku na Internetu, u članku se pokušava analizirati razvoj politike nesvrstanih u drugoj polovini 1960-ih, uloga koju su u njoj odigrali Jugoslavija i lično predsednik Josip Broz Tito, kao i načini izlaska iz krize Pokreta nesvrstanih. U širokom međunarodnom kontekstu istražuju se inicijative za održavanje međunarodnog samita posvećenog saradnji zemalja Azije, Afrike i nekih drugih regiona sveta, te razlozi uspeha jugoslovensko-indijskog koncepta nesvrstanih. Razmatra se priprema konferencije u Lusaki; opseg tamo pokrenutih pitanja; struktura stalnih institucija Pokreta nesvrstanih formiranih na samitu; uticaj donetih odluka na dalji razvoj Pokreta nesvrstanih sedamdesetih godina.

Ključne reči: Jugoslavija, spoljna politika, diplomatija, Pokret nesvrstanih, Konferencija nesvrstanih u Lusaki, Josip Broz Tito